The Supply Chain Architecture Underlying Afghanistan Strategy

As I was reading a variety of news and blogs today, I noticed a common thread: Afghanistan's logistical issues, from both a strategic and tactical perspective, in relation to the current effort there to provide the security and stability that must underly political and economic progress.

I had first stopped at Dr. Tom Barnett's blog, which I have been frequenting much more lately since his new book, Great Powers, was released last week. He posted "All roads to Afghanistan..." and of course when anyone mentions roads, my supply chain radar kicks in. Tom comments on the issue regarding American use of bases in the old Soviet Republic states and Russia's adjacent influence (highlights mine):

"Clearly the Russians are letting us know that all roads to Afghanistan through Central Asia run through Moscow. Manas is significant. I was there November-before-last and it impresses. But what you will see if the Kyrgyz aren't smart enough to finesse this is: somebody else happy to get the spending will step up. Despite the Pentagon's constant fears of being shut out of some situation, that happens--time and time again. Somebody always steps up. Typically, they offer something a bit lighter and tighter, but that's our continuing pattern anyway--more networked in more places (we're becoming the Verizon of militaries). But isn't that what you want anyway in this world?"

Manas is one node in the NATO/U.S. military's supply chain, but as Tom says, it is significant. It is significant not just because of the established facilities, but also because it is not going to be easily replaceable. U.S. military logisticians will hope Tom is right and that another country steps in offering an alternate base (node) to route their supply chains through.

From this point, I was checking one of my email inboxes, and noticed a transcript from the Department of Defense for a press conference with Secretary of Defense Gates (I subscribe to the transcript mailing list). In this press conference, the Manas topic is raised:

"Question: Just in December, you were in Kyrgyzstan speaking about what an important transit point Manas Air Force Base is. We haven't heard anything official, but it seems pretty apparent it's going to close in the next six months or so. Can you talk a little about whether you see -- how you see this impacting Afghanistan, any possible other transit locations that are under negotiations right now? 

"SEC. GATES: Well, I would say that Manas is important, but not irreplaceable. We are looking at alternatives. We have not foreclosed the possibility that Manas would remain open. We're looking at whether, given the importance that Manas plays and the likely growing importance of Manas, whether there is something we ought to do differently in terms of compensation. 

"By the same -- by the same token, we're not prepared to stay there at any price. And so, as I say, I think we're exploring a variety of options, and I think we have some alternatives. But clearly Manas is important to us.

"Question: Do you still -- or do you consider the negotiations still open at this point? 

"SEC. GATES: I think so, yeah."

If the U.S. military/NATO has conducted alternative supply chain scenario planning thoroughly, they should already have a clear idea what alternatives exist and how realistic each basing option will be--SoD Gates is projecting, necessarily, vagueness so as not to disrupt the basing evaluation process and potentially lose hold of any alternatives. He also hints that they will revisit other supply chain levers, such as financial compensation, in order to perhaps retain Manas. This is obviously preferrable since establishing a new supply chain node for something as sensitive as U.S. military/NATO equipment and personnel will be methodical and slower than desired. Not only does the new base need to be up to spec in terms of facilities, political agreements need to be made, and proper security and support services established.

 

In the back of my mind, I remembered via The Long War Journal that the Taliban and collaborative forces had already severed the supply line for NATO through the Khyber Pass. As a result, the U.S./NATO has supply chain instability and pressures on multiple fronts at a time when Afghanistan is in an extremely vulnerable state. This leads me into two more articles sent to me in my inbox in the last day. One is from Michael Yon, who steps back and really gives us the big picture view of Afghanistan's troubles in the post "How Much is Afghanistan Really Worth to Us?" First, he highlights what I picked up on above (before reading his post) as the logistical issues on multiple fronts (highlights mine):

"While we prepare to shunt perhaps 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan (which still will not be enough), Russia continues to play the Asian chessboard.  The Russians are picking off pawn after pawn, and steadily eroding our foreign policy influence with them and other Central Asian countries.  The Russians know that we need a land route through their country to Afghanistan, especially as we begin the slow process of increasing our combat presence.  The Pakistan land route is one Achilles' heel to our Afghanistan effort, and Russia is working hard to make sure that Russia is the other Achilles' heel, which will strengthen the Russian position on matters such as missile defense.  Russia, at the present rate, will eventually exercise considerable control over the spigot to Afghanistan.  The Russians are successfully wrestling us into a policy arm-lock.  While Russia takes American money and gains influence over our Afghan efforts, we will continue to spend lives and tens of billions of dollars per year on Afghanistan in an attempt to civilize what amounts to Jurassic Park."

Michael finishes the post by outlining what believes are the conditions necessary to at least have a chance of succeeding in Afghanistan:

• the U.S. military maintains its fighting superiority
• the U.S. President supports the effort 110%
• the U.S. military is ruthless in killing off the collaborative of armed opposition groups (AOGs)

This leads me to the final emailed post I received from Bill Roggio at The Long War Journal, titled "Al Qaeda's paramilitary 'Shadow Army'." This post provides important insight into an important component of the AOG collaborative that is strengthening in the border regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan. You should read the entire post to truly understand this threat, but the first few paragraphs provide a good overview of their capabilities and reach:

"Al Qaeda has reorganized its notorious paramilitary formations that were devastated during the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002. Al Qaeda has reestablished the predominantly Arab and Asian paramilitary formation that was formerly known as Brigade 055 into a larger, more effective fighting unit known as the Lashkar al Zil, or Shadow Army, a senior US intelligence official told The Long War Journal.

"The Shadow Army is active primarily in Pakistan's tribal areas, the Northwest Frontier Province, and in eastern and southern Afghanistan, several US military and intelligence officials told The Long War Journal on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the subject.

"The paramilitary force is well trained and equipped, and has successfully defeated the Pakistani Army in multiple engagements. Inside Pakistan, the Shadow Army has been active in successful Taliban campaigns in North and South Waziristan, Bajaur, Peshawar, Khyber, and Swat.

"In Afghanistan, the Shadow Army has conducted operations against Coalition and Afghan forces in Kunar, Nuristan, Nangahar, Kabul, Logar, Wardak, Khost, Paktika, Paktia, Zabul, Ghazni, and Kandahar provinces.

""The Shadow Army has been instrumental in the Taliban's consolidation of power in Pakistan's tribal areas and in the Northwest Frontier Province," a senior intelligence official said. "They are also behind the Taliban's successes in eastern and southern Afghanistan. They are helping to pinch Kabul.""

What I take away from this collection of articles and posts is an obvious growth in the sophistication of AOG supply chains, in the sense that their internal supply chain provides them mobility and reach towards selected targets while they simultaneously have the ability and supply chain intelligence to not only interrupt but also cripple U.S. military/NATO supply chain architectures (what is this?). On the other hand, U.S. military/NATO supply chain architectures are on defense at the Pakistan border and Central Asia borders. While true that the AOG supply chain sophistication has yet to reach the level of the U.S. military, the U.S. supply chain is far more extended and thus more exposed to instability. This is exacerbated by the fact that the supply chain nodes surrounding Afghanistan exist in countries that are also underdeveloped states (former Soviet states), highly unstable states (Pakistan), or highly insular/hostile states (Iran).

With the U.S. raising the troop commitment in Afghanistan, it is absolutely necessary that they have the most sophisticated, underlying supply chain architecture in-theater, and that its innovation architecture is geared towards being highly disruptive and destructive when targeting the AOG's own supply chain architectures--physical (bases, training camps, hideouts), financial (cash lines, funding sources), informational (communication and IT), relational (collaborators and partners), innovational (new techniques and training camp programs), and human (recruiting, training and leadership).

In the midst of all this, will the NATO alliance survive? Its resilience to the conditions in Afghanistan has been severely tested. I believe we need to ensure NATO maintains its presence, but perhaps with a growth in U.S. forces, it should focus more on the complementary tasks of building local security infrastructures, establishing and/or strengthening civilian-military links in managing civil affairs and reconstruction, and providing training and recruiting support for the Afghan National Forces.

ALSO: See my previous post on Asia Development Bank efforts in coordinating overall infrastructure investment and development in the Central Asia region surrounding Afghanistan: